We study the acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1,305 firms from 59 industries during the 1990-99 period. Consistent with the importance of restructuring activity during the 1990s, we find that half of the sample firms are acquired or engage in a major divestiture. Consistent with the notion that economic change is a source of the observed restructuring activity, we find significant industry clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures. We also study the announcement effects of the two forms of restructuring and find that both acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s increase shareholder wealth.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the causes and effects of acquisitions and divestitures during the 1990s. The general purpose of our analysis is to bring new evidence to bear on the contrasting views of corporate restructuring that have been presented in research on earlier time periods. 1 We study whether corporate restructuring can best be typified as an efficient response to economic shocks or instead is better described as an imperfect reaction to management entrenchment and hubris.
Our initial analysis gauges the impact of economic shocks on corporate restructuring activity by studying whether there are industry patterns in acquisitions and divestitures. We follow the premise of recent studies of merger patterns by Mitchell & Mulherin (1986) and Andrade & Stafford (1999) that the clustering of restructuring activity in particular industries emanates from fundamental economic shocks. Our work can be distinguished from the other research by our emphasis on the 1990s and by our consideration of both acquisitions and divestitures. Consistent with the importance of economic shocks for restructuring activity, we find that both acquisitions and divestitures exhibit significant industry clustering.
To more directly determine the importance of economic shocks for acquisitions and divestitures, the main body of the paper uses event study analysis to empirically distinguish between two broad sets of theories of corporate restructuring: the non-synergistic theory and the synergistic theory. The joint consideration of acquisitions and divestitures facilitates more refined tests of the two theories than can be attained by studying either acquisitions or divestitures in isolation. In particular, we study whether acquisitions and divestitures have an asymmetric or symmetric effect on shareholder wealth.
The first set of models that we test can collectively be labeled the non-synergistic theory. These include models based on management entrenchment, empire building, and managerial hubris. (See, for example, Shleifer & Vishny (1989) , Jensen (1986), and Roll (1986) .) Although differing in assumptions and emphasis, these theories generally predict an asymmetric relation between the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures. In the models, divestitures create wealth by increasing specialization and reducing agency costs while acquisitions lower wealth by protecting management from market forces and by lessening corporate focus.
A second set of theories poses synergistic reasons for both acquisitions and divestitures. The origin of this line of thought is usually traced to Coase (1937) who theorizes that the size of the firm responds over time to factors that affect the relative costs of market pricing and internal management decisions. As an example, Coase (1937, footnotes 31 and 32) argues that technological change will alter the efficient size of the firm and, by implication, affect the decision to engage in acquisitions or divestitures.
Subsequent analysis has extended these insights. Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) argue that acquisitions and divestitures represent reactions to changes in the transaction costs created by specialized assets. Bradley, Desai, & Kim (1988, p.4) posit that mergers occur when bidding firms attempt "to exploit a profit opportunity created by a change in economic conditions." Jensen (1993) more specifically relates the restructuring activity of the 1980s to changes in technology, input prices, and regulation. In contrast to the nonsynergistic theory, the synergistic models predict that both acquisitions and divestitures create wealth.
We test the predictions of the non-synergistic and synergistic theories by studying the announcement effects of acquisitions and divestitures during the 1990s. We find that both acquisitions and divestitures create wealth. Moreover, the wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are directly related to the size of the restructuring event. The symmetric, positive wealth effects for both acquisitions and divestitures are consistent with a synergistic explanation for the two restructuring events and are inconsistent with non-synergistic models based on management entrenchment, empire building, and hubris.
The sample used in our analysis is described in the following section. Section 3 characterizes the overall restructuring activity for the sample firms during the 1990s and Section 4 reports the industry patterns in acquisitions and divestitures. The fifth section presents the evidence on wealth effects. The final section summarizes the results and offers concluding comments.
The Sample
The intent of our analysis is to study the causes and effects of acquisitions and divestitures during the 1990s. To implement our research design, we begin with a sample of firms covered by the Value Line Investment Survey and track their restructuring activity between 1990 and 1999. Our general procedure bears resemblance to recent research such as Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) and Andrade & Stafford (1999) and allows us to estimate the rate of acquisitions and divestitures both in aggregate and at the industry level. The firms listed on Value Line are heavily followed in the media, allowing us to precisely pinpoint the incidence and nature of particular restructuring events. The use of Value Line also enables accurate assignment of firms to industries and avoids the ambiguity created from the reliance on SIC codes reported in CRSP and Compustat. (See Kahle & Walkling (1996) .)
The use of Value Line as the basis for our sample also facilitates comparisons of the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures. Rather than draw the two forms of restructuring from heterogeneous sets of firms, the acquisitions and divestitures are taken from a common universe. As reported below, this ensures that the relative size of the sample acquisitions and divestitures are of a comparable order of magnitude. The resulting sample of 1,305 firms is characterized in Table 1 . The firms come from 59 industries spanning Aerospace/Defense to Trucking. By number of firms, the Electric Utility industry has the greatest representation with 102 firms. In terms of equity value at year-end 1989, the Telecommunications industry is the largest at $259 billion.
The total value of the 1,305 sample firms at year-end 1989 is $2.5 trillion, which is 71 percent of the combined equity value of the listings on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in 1989. The average firm in the sample has a value of $1.9 billion at year-end 1989.
Overall Acquisition and Divestiture Activity in the 1990s
For each of the sample firms, we track acquisition and divestiture activity during the 1990s. Relying on the Wall Street Journal Index, Lexis/Nexis, Mergers and Acquisitions, and other financial and news media, we determine whether and when a sample firm is acquired. Using the same sources, we also determine whether a sample firm engaged in any major divestitures, including corporate spinoffs, equity carve-outs and asset sales. The spinoffs and carve-outs in the sample are readily classifiable. By contrast, the choice of asset sales to include in the sample is somewhat more problematic, due to the substantial variation in the size of both the sample firms and their assets divested via direct sale. Our criterion in classifying an asset sale as "major" is that the sold assets were either worth at least $100 million in absolute terms or represented at least five percent of the equity value of the divesting parent.
The results on overall acquisition and divestiture activity during the 1990s are reported in Table 2 . A total of 335 firms (25.7 percent of the sample) are acquired but do not engage in a divestiture. In addition, 222 firms (17 percent) undertake a major divestiture but are not acquired. Finally, 46 firms (3.5 percent) engage in a divestiture and are later acquired.
As a whole, roughly half (46 percent) of the sample firms are acquired and/or engage in a major divestiture during the 1990s. These results indicate that the restructuring in the most recent decade has some comparability to the significant wave that occurred in the 1980s. As a comparison, Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) estimate that 48 percent of their sample firms were acquired or engaged in a defensive asset restructuring during the 1982-89 period. Table 2 also reports some characteristics of firms that turn out to be acquisition or divestiture candidates. Based on equity values at the time of the formation of the sample, firms that are acquired are smaller than average; the average value of the acquired firms as of year-end 1989 is $1.1 billion. By contrast, the firms engaging in divestitures are much larger; the average value of a firm undertaking a major divestiture is $4.7 billion. In results not reported in the table but available upon request, these relations hold at the industry level; acquired firms are generally smaller than their industry peers while divesting firms are larger than their industry counterparts. We report further data on the relative value of targets to bidders and divested subsidiaries to parents later in the text.
Acquisition and Divestiture Activity by Industry
We next estimate whether there are industry patterns in the rate of acquisition and divestiture activity during the 1990s. Our analysis is motivated by the theory of the firm (e.g., Coase (1937) ), which argues that firm size responds to changing economic conditions. Subsequent theory by Jensen (1993) more specifically relates corporate restructuring to changes in technology, input prices and regulation. Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) support the theory of the firm by finding significant patterns in acquisitions across industries in the 1980s. We provide further evidence by studying acquisitions in the 1990s and by extending the analysis to industry patterns in divestiture activity. A natural query is whether any of the sources of the inter-industry variation in acquisition activity can be identified. Jensen (1993) argues that the restructuring in the 1980s was induced by changes in regulation as well as a desire to eliminate industry overcapacity. In support of these conjectures, Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) find that the rate of takeover activity by industry is higher in deregulated industries and in low-tech industries with little or no research and development or other growth options.
Industry Patterns in Acquisition Activity
We consider whether acquisition activity in the 1990s is driven by similar factors as the 1980s. We regress the rate of acquisition activity by industry on two variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to one for seven industries that underwent federal deregulation in the 1990s. The federal deregulation and the affected industries are: The positive and significant coefficient for the Deregulation Dummy indicates that, consistent with the 1980s, deregulation has a significant, positive effect on the acquisition activity in the 1990s. Of course, the affected industries differ over time. In the 1980s, deregulation induced significant merger activity in industries such as air transport, natural gas and trucking. In the 1990s, deregulation was directed toward sectors including banking, electric utilities, and telecommunications. Indeed, past research has often excluded industries such as banking, telecommunications and electric utilities due to heavy regulation. The removal of the regulatory burdens in these industries allows them to become part of mainstream merger analysis.
The coefficient for R&D/Sales is not significantly different from zero. In contrast to the 1980s, merger activity in the 1990s is not restricted to industries with low growth options. Indeed, some of the industries shown in Table 3 to have the highest rate of acquisition activity during the 1990s include Telecommunications, Electrical Equipment, and Electronics that are in hi-tech, growing sectors. These results are consistent with related findings in Andrade & Stafford (1999) and indicate that mergers can facilitate both industry consolidation and industry expansion.
As a more direct analysis of acquisition activity in the 1980s and 1990s, we compare the rate of activity across industries in the two decades. Our sample has 42 industries that overlap those studied by Mitchell & Mulherin (1996 , Table 3 ) for the 1980s. The simple correlation coefficient of the rate of acquisition activity between the two samples from the two decades is 0.25 (p=0.11). This confirms that while there was significant restructuring activity in both the 1980s and 1990s, there was not a one-to-one relation in the affected industries.
Industry Patterns in Divestiture Activity
We next analyze whether there are industry patterns in divestiture activity. Table   4 reports the results. For the median industry, 18 percent of the firms engaged in at least one major divestiture in the 1990-99 period. Like acquisitions, however, there is a wide variation in divestiture activity across industries. In the Chemical (Diversified) industry, 67 percent of the firms undertook a major divestiture. By contrast, several industries, including Toiletries/Cosmetics, refrained from any measurable divestiture activity.
To determine whether the frequency of divestiture activity significantly differs across industries, we compute the Pearson chi-square statistic. The value of the statistic is 110 (d.f.=58, p-level=0.001), indicating a rejection of the null of no difference in divestiture activity across industries.
The estimates of acquisition and divestiture activity by industry in Table 3 and   Table 4 Table 3 are also at the median or above in the ranking of divestiture activity in Table 4 . Dasgupta, Goyal & Tan (1999) report similar findings for a sample of mergers and divestitures in the 1986-94 period.
The comparison of industry patterns in acquisitions and divestitures is somewhat crude as acquired firms, by the nature of our research design, cannot subsequently engage in a divestiture. To account for sample attrition due to acquisitions, we re-estimated the rates of divestiture activity based on the available firm years for each industry. For example, in our sample the Shoe industry has 12 firms, or a total of 120 firm years in the 1990-99 period. But one firm in the industry was acquired in 1995, reducing the available firm years to 116. After accounting for sample attrition due to acquisitions, our estimates for the adjusted rate of divestiture by industry are also insignificantly related to the industry rate of acquisitions; the correlation coefficient is -0.03 (p-level = 0.84).
The similarity in results for both the unadjusted and adjusted rates of divestitures is due, in part, to the fact that a majority of the acquisitions in the sample occur in the second half of the 1990s. Table 5 reports that 33 percent of the acquisitions were completed in the 1990-94 period, compared with 67 percent in the 1995-99 period.
Overall, the analysis in this section finds significant industry clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures. These results are consistent with the theory of the firm, which predicts that corporate restructuring is a function of industry shocks and changing economic conditions. In the next section, we estimate whether the reaction to changing economic conditions is wealth enhancing.
Wealth Effects of Acquisitions and Divestitures
A large body of research has studied the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures. Much of the research on acquisitions is reviewed by Jensen & Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley & Netter (1988) . The Appendix to this paper notes some of the more recent research on acquisitions as well as selected research on divestitures.
In this section, we expand on the prior work by estimating the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s. Our joint consideration of acquisitions and divestitures allows us to distinguish between non-synergistic and synergistic theories of corporate restructuring. In particular, we study whether acquisitions and divestitures have an asymmetric or symmetric effect on shareholder wealth.
Data Used to Estimate the Wealth Effects of Acquisitions and Divestitures
Our analysis of the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures employs standard event study techniques. As such, our only data requirement is stock price information around the announcement of the restructuring events. For acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990-98 period, we obtain the data from CRSP. For events in 1999, we obtain the data from the Daily Stock Price Record. Table 6 sketches the data available for the estimation of wealth effects. Panel A reports data availability for acquisitions. As reported previously in Table 2 , a total of 381 sample firms are acquired in the 1990-99 period. Five of these firms, however, are delisted prior to the announcement of their acquisition, leaving 376 target firms available for the analysis of wealth effects. Within this sample, 281 of the targets are acquired by U.S. publicly-traded firms having available stock price data to be used to estimate the wealth effects for the bidders as well as the combined target and bidder return.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the data availability for divestitures. As reported previously in Table 2 , a total of 268 sample firms engaged in at least one major divestiture in the 1990-99 period. Because some firms undertook more than one divestiture over the sample period, there are a total of 370 divestitures that can be used in the analysis of wealth effects. As noted in Table 6 , within this divestiture sample, there are 106 corporate spinoffs, 125 equity carve-outs, and 139 asset sales. Table 7 provides information on the relative size of the acquisitions and divestitures in the sample. Panel A reports the relative value of the acquisitions, defined as the equity value of the target divided by the equity value of the bidder, both measured two days prior to the initial announcement of the acquisition bid. Data are available for the 281 acquisitions with both target and bidder equity value. The average target firm is 42 percent as large as the average bidder. The median relative value is 27 percent. The median size of the target to the bidder is somewhat larger than that reported by Jarrell & Poulsen (1989, Exhibit 1) for acquisitions in the 1970s and 1980s (though not the 1960s), which is expected since we sampled the acquisition targets from firms covered by Value Line.
The Relative Value of Acquisitions and Divestitures
Panel B of Table 7 reports the relative value of the 370 sample divestitures. For spinoffs, the relative value is defined as the equity value of the spinoff on the first day of trading divided by the equity value of the parent on the day before the spinoff. The mean estimate for the relative value of spinoffs is 22 percent and the median is 14 percent.
To provide a comparable measure for equity carve-outs, the relative value is defined as the equity value of the carve-out (offer price times total shares outstanding) divided by the equity value of the parent on the offer date. The mean estimate for the relative value of carve-outs is 37 percent and the median is 17 percent. An alternative measure for the relative value of the sample carve-outs based on offer proceeds rather than total equity value of the subsidiary, not reported in the table, generates a mean of 16 percent and a median of 7 percent.
For asset sales, the relative value is defined as the reported price of the asset sale divided by the asset value of the parent at the year-end prior to the announcement of the asset sale. We choose to weight asset sales by parent asset value because using parent equity value can lead to relative values larger than 100 percent, especially for parents experiencing financial difficulty. (See Brown, James & Mooradian (1994) .) The mean estimate for the relative value of asset sales is 18 percent and the median is 11 percent.
Across all 370 observations, the average divestiture comprises 26 percent of the parent firm. The median relative value of the sample divestitures is 13 percent. Although there is some variation in the mean relative size across the three types of divestitures, the median relative values are comparable across divestiture types.
Overall, the data in Table 7 indicate that both the acquisition and divestiture samples entail important events. The relative value of target firms and divested firms are both more than 25 percent of the value of, respectively, the bidding firm and the divesting parent. This facilitates a direct comparison of the wealth effects of the two forms of restructuring.
Wealth Effects for the Sample Acquisitions and Divestitures
In this section we estimate the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures. Our primary objective is to test two contrasting theories of corporate restructuring: the nonsynergistic theory and the synergistic theory. Within the non-synergistic theory, we group models based on management entrenchment, empire building, and managerial hubris.
Within the synergistic theory, we include models such as Coase (1937) , Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) , and Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) . Our joint analysis of acquisitions and divestitures enables tests that directly distinguish between the two theories. In particular, the non-synergistic theory predicts asymmetric wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures (see, for example, Shleifer & Vishny (1989) ) while the synergistic theory predicts that both acquisitions and divestitures create wealth. Table 8 sketches the specific analysis used to test the two competing theories. As noted in Panel A, both theories predict that the announcement effect of corporate divestitures will be positive. By contrast, the non-synergistic theory predicts that the combined bidder-target return in acquisitions will be negative while the synergistic theory predicts that the combined wealth effect in acquisitions will be positive.
As outlined in Panel B of Table 8 , the two theories also make contrasting predictions regarding the relation between wealth effects and the relative size of the event. The non-synergistic theory predicts that larger divestitures will have a more positive effect on shareholder wealth while larger acquisitions will be relatively more detrimental to shareholders, as the acquisition of a larger target will induce greater management entrenchment. The synergistic theory predicts that larger acquisitions and divestitures will both have relatively more positive effects on shareholder wealth.
In our analysis of the wealth effects of acquisitions and divestitures, we estimate changes in equity value at the time of the announcement of the two restructuring events.
Because we want to isolate on the specific market reaction to the two events, we focus on a narrow window of the (-1,+1) period around the events, where day 0 is the initial announcement as determined from Lexis/Nexis, the Wall Street Journal Index, and other financial and news media. Because of the employment of this narrow window, we simply rely on net-of-market estimates of the abnormal returns. In results available upon request, we also employ other estimation techniques such as the market model and obtain findings comparable to those reported in the text. Similarly, the use of longer event windows does not alter the inferences drawn in the text. For events from the 1990-98 period, the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. For events in 1999, the market index is the S&P 500. Table 9 This positive combined wealth effect for acquisitions is consistent with the synergistic theory. Table 10 reports the wealth effects for the sample divestitures. On average, the divestitures create wealth. For the full sample of 370 divestitures, the average net-ofmarket return for the (-1,+1) period is 3.04 percent. The median abnormal return is 1.75 percent. The positive wealth effects hold for all three types of divestitures. The mean abnormal return is 4.51 percent for corporate spinoffs, is 2.27 percent for equity carveouts, and is 2.60 percent for asset sales. These results are comparable in magnitude to research on divestitures from earlier time periods.
In results not reported in the table, we further study the subset of asset sales with data available for the buyers of the assets. Of the 139 asset sales in the sample, there are 56 cases where the buyer is either a foreign firm or a private U.S. firm, leaving 83 cases where the buyer is a publicly traded U.S. firm. In this sub-sample, the asset sales also create wealth. The mean CAR for the seller is 1.75 percent (t=2.57) and for the buyer is 1.34 percent. The mean, value-weighted CAR for the buyer and the seller is 1.18 percent (t=2.88).
Overall, the results on wealth effects indicate that both acquisitions and divestitures create wealth. These findings are consistent with the synergistic theory of corporate restructuring. The results indicate that corporate decisions to expand and to contract both benefit shareholders, on average, in the 1990s. These findings on wealth effects are consistent with the results in Maksimovic and Phillips (1999) that both mergers and asset sales improve total factor productivity.
Wealth Effects and the Relative Value of Acquisitions and Divestitures
The basic results on wealth effects indicate that the average acquisition and the average divestiture in the 1990s create wealth. While consistent with the synergistic theory, the results do not indicate the sources of wealth gains from corporate restructuring. Moreover, the results do not conclusively reject the non-synergistic theory, as the average returns do not account for the size of the particular restructuring events.
(See, e.g., Roll (1986).) To provide cross-sectional tests that distinguish between the synergistic and non-synergistic theories, we estimate whether the wealth gains in the sample acquisitions and divestitures are related to the relative size of the restructuring events.
There is some prior analysis of this relation between wealth effects and the relative size of acquisitions and divestitures. Servaes (1991) finds that the combined return to targets and bidders is positively related to the relative size of the target. The papers on divestitures listed in the Appendix generally report that the abnormal returns in corporate divestitures are directly related to the relative size of the divested entity. We extend this analysis by jointly studying acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s.
Column (1) of Table 11 reports the results for the 281 acquisitions with available target and bidder data. The analysis entails an OLS regression that estimates the relation between the combined target and bidder return at acquisition announcement and the relative value of the acquisition. The coefficient for Relative Value is positive and more than 3 standard errors different from zero. Hence, the combined target and bidder returns in the sample are directly related to the relative value of the acquisition.
Column (2) of Table 11 reports comparable analysis for the sample of 370 divestitures. Similar to the acquisition sample, the coefficient of Relative Value is positive and significant in the divestiture regression. Consistent with prior research, the wealth creation at the announcement of corporate divestitures is directly related to the relative size of the divestiture.
Interestingly, the estimated parameters in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 are virtually identical. Hence, whether expanding or downsizing, the impact on shareholder wealth is comparably related to the relative size of the restructuring event. The results provide further support for the synergistic theory of acquisitions and divestitures and are not consistent with the non-synergistic models.
Summary and Concluding Comments
In this paper, we compare the acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1,305 firms from 59 industries in the 1990-99 period. We find a significant occurrence of these two forms of restructuring during the 1990s. Roughly half of the sample firms are acquired or engage in a major divestiture in the sample period.
We also find significant industry clustering in acquisition and divestiture activity during the 1990s. Consistent with results for the 1980s, we find that acquisition activity is greater in industries undergoing deregulation, although the specific industries affected by deregulation differ between the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to the evidence for the 1980s, we find that acquisitions in the 1990s are not restricted to industries with low growth options.
We find that the acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s create wealth. Indeed, the wealth creation from the two restructuring events is comparable in magnitude. The combined target and bidder return at the announcement of an acquisition averages 3.5 percent, while the announcement return for corporate divestitures averages 3.0 percent.
Moreover, the wealth creation for both acquisitions and divestitures is directly related to the relative size of the restructuring event.
As a whole, these results are consistent with the predictions of the synergistic theory of the firm that changing economic conditions and industry shocks are at play in restructuring activity. Indeed, the results indicate that firms efficiently respond to economic change, whether such changes induce an expansion (via merger) or a reduction (via divestiture) in firm size. The symmetric relation for both acquisitions and divestitures is inconsistent with non-synergistic models based on management entrenchment, empire building and managerial hubris which argue that firms expand for reasons other than wealth creation. In the 1990s, the corporate restructuring decisions made by management, whether downsizing or expansion, on average benefit shareholders.
Our results on the incidence and wealth effects of corporate restructuring in the 1990s have important policy implications. Many have interpreted the abrupt reversal of corporate takeovers at the end of the 1980s as evidence that entrenched managers could rely on antitakeover provisions and state laws to inhibit the market for corporate control.
Our results of an active corporate control market in the 1990s, however, support Comment & Schwert's (1995) forecast that the decline in takeovers in the late 1980s and early 1990s would prove to be driven by economic conditions rather than legal burdens. the same as in prior decades? Along these lines, Boone (1999) reports that the source of gains from corporate divestitures is sensitive to time period. Clearly an ongoing comparison of acquisitions and divestitures will continue to enlighten us on the causes and effects of corporate restructuring.
Appendix. This Appendix summarizes selected prior research on acquisitions and divestitures. Panel A reviews selected papers that study the announcement returns for targets and bidders in acquisitions. Panels B.1 to B.3 review selected papers on corporate spinoffs, equity carve-outs, and asset sales that include analysis of the effect of the relative size of the divestiture and wealth effects. Table 9 . Wealth Effects for the Sample Acquisitions. This table reports the wealth effects for the sample acquisitions. All estimates are net-of-market, cumulative abnormal returns for the (-1,+1) period, where day 0 is the date of the initial announcement of the acquisition bid, as determined from Lexis/Nexis, the Wall Street Journal Index, and other financial and news media. Panel A reports the wealth effects for the 376 targets with available stock price data. Panel B reports the wealth effects for the 281 acquisitions where the bidder is a U.S. publicly-traded firm with available stock price data. Note that bidder returns are based on the date of the first mention of the bidder in the financial press, which may be later than the initial announcement date for the target. The Combined Return is the value-weighted CAR, defined as: (target value * target CAR + bidder value * bidder CAR) / (target value + bidder value), where bidder and target values are the equity value two days prior to the initial acquisition announcement. Data from 1990-98 are obtained from CRSP and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. Data from 1999 are obtained from the Daily Stock Price Record and the market index is the S&P 500. The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the mean CAR equals zero. The p-level is for the Wilcoxon sign rank test that the median differs from zero. (1) reports the results for acquisitions, where the dependent variable is the combined bidder and target net-of-market return at the announcement (days -1,+1) of the acquisition and the independent variable is the relative value of the acquisition (target value / bidder value), as defined in Panel A of Table 7 . Column (2) reports the results for divestitures, where the dependent variable is the net-of-market return for the parent at the announcement (days -1,+1) of the divestiture and the independent variable is the relative value of the divestiture (divested entity / parent value), as defined in Panel B of Table 7 . Data from 1990-98 are obtained from CRSP and the market index is the CRSP valueweighted index. Data from 1999 are obtained from the Daily Stock Price Record and the market index is the S&P 500.
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